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Article 4

Penalty Default Interpretive Canons

*

Rebecca M. Kysar†
INTRODUCTION
A preference for a particular method of statutory
interpretation over another often relates to one’s view of the
legislative process. In advancing his textualist approach, for
example, Justice Scalia relies in part on a conception that the
legislative process, filled with self-serving representatives who
plant misleading statements into the legislative record,
malfunctions.1 Purposivists, on the other hand, share a more
benign opinion of the legislative process—interpreting statutes
in accordance with meritorious, public-regarding aims that
were presumably sought by lawmakers in enacting the
legislation in question. Neither understanding of the legislative
process satisfies,2 and scholars continue to search for methods
of statutory interpretation that reflect the actual functioning of
the legislative process.
A scholarly focus on whether a methodology of statutory
interpretation is too cynical or too optimistic of the legislative
process, however, is incomplete; in evaluating a methodology,
scholarship must also explore how it affects the legislative
process. Whether courts should remedy defects in the
legislative process through the interpretive endeavor—or even
whether they can—have been enduring questions in the
*

© 2011 Rebecca M. Kysar. All rights reserved.
Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For extremely valuable
comments, I am grateful to Kelly Dunbar, Anita Krishnakumar, Minor Myers, Larry
Solan, and the participants of this symposium, as well as those of the 2011 panel for
the AALS Section on Legislation and the Law of the Political Process.
1
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 34 (1997).
2
Even modern public-choice theory—a school of political science rooted in
cynicism of representatives’ incentives—accepts a view of lawmakers that encompasses
their pursuit of ideological preferences, in addition to campaign contributions and other
rents. At times, however, the legal academy has not embraced such an expansive view
of the theory. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
66-68, 77 (1990).
†
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academy,3 although one rarely visited in recent years. In this
short essay, I conclude that such a curative function is indeed
possible and desirable when Congress itself wishes it.
Congress, for instance, has internal rules designed to cure
collective-action problems yet often has no means of enforcing
them, even when it so desires. I propose, however, that courts
can sometimes aid Congress by assuming that those rules
function correctly even when they do not.
This interpretive approach falls within my novel
categorization of several methodologies that contemplate a
mismatch between reality and the view of the legislative
process they assume. It is precisely this distorted view that
eradicates identified problems in the legislative process. The
problem I focus upon in this essay is that of “hidden” specialinterest provisions, the beneficiaries of which are not
transparent to other lawmakers or in the statute’s plain
language. More specifically, by assuming counterfactually that
legislators actually disclose special-interest provisions, courts
can create incentives for lawmakers to indeed do so.
Collectively, I label these methodologies “penalty
default interpretive canons”4 because they are analogous to the
famous Ayres-Gertner thesis recommending that courts employ
“penalty default” rules to specify outcomes that the contracting
parties do not wish and, in turn, create incentives for the
parties to reveal efficiency-enhancing information.5 Penalty
default interpretive canons punish individual lawmakers who
obscurely dole out special-interest benefits by refusing to give
those deals effect. These canons accordingly motivate
lawmakers to make special-interest benefits manifest—and
3

See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 319 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); William D. Popkin, Foreword: Nonjudicial
Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 315 (1990); Jane S. Schacter,
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-11 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539, 1584-85 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 457 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes]; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2114-15 (1990).
4
Two scholars have labeled their proposal, by which courts would hold
unconstitutional “statutes whose incompleteness is designed to shift responsibility
from the legislature onto other governmental branches,” as “the penalty default canon.”
Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 663, 667 (2004). My labeling differs in that it applies to canons of statutory
interpretation rather than constitutionality.
5
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
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thus subject to congressional and public scrutiny—during the
legislative process.
These canons generally do no interpretive harm when
the legislative process accords with its assumed goal; that is,
when it is clear that statutory provisions benefit certain special
interests, the canons operate to bestow those benefits. Thus,
penalty default interpretive canons may satisfy both cynics of
and believers in the legislative process. By identifying such a
category, this essay presents a more robust typology of theories
and methods of statutory construction vis-à-vis the legislative
process.
This essay starts from the premise that hidden interestgroup deals are problematic—a foundational assumption supported
by pluralist and republican theories alike.6 When one’s view of the
legislative process’s proper aims expands from transparency in
lawmaking, one will accept other interpretive methods as properly
invoked—even when they rest upon unrealistic conjectures about
the legislative process—so long as the conjecture is curative of the
assumed “ills” that befall Congress.
In Part I of this essay, I discuss typical critiques of two
dominant
interpretive
methodologies—textualism
and
purposivism—that focus on their unrealistic depictions of the
legislative process. In Part II, I then set forth the category of
penalty default canons. Specifically, I discuss the several
theories and methodologies that comprise this category and
argue that their improbable account of the legislative process
counterintuitively improves upon it. I also identify aspects of
textualism and purposivism that may function as penalty
default interpretive canons depending on one’s conception of
the ideal legislative process. I conclude, however, that the
subset of penalty default interpretive canons deriving from
Congress’s own rules intrudes less on Congress’s lawmaking
function than other interpretive canons and methodologies.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL TYPOLOGY

One could argue that interpretive methodologies are
improperly invoked when their underlying view of the
6

See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory
Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 575-78 (2009) (arguing that pluralists
generally would not seek to enforce interest-group deals that are hidden from
congressional members while republicans would generally prefer exposure of interestgroup deals to further deliberation).
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legislative process deviates from that process’s actual
functioning. I refer to this perspective as the “traditional” way
of understanding statutory interpretation, and in this part,
apply it to both textualism and purposivism.
A.

Textualism

I begin with textualism. Textualists rely, in part, on
hypothesized dysfunctions in the legislative process to justify
rejecting a statute’s legislative history in favor of the statutory
text. They argue, for example, that members of Congress do not
use legislative history to enrich debate or to convince their
colleagues of a statute’s proper meaning; instead, Congress uses
legislative history strategically to influence later judicial
constructions of the legislation. Owing to the massive increase in
statutory proposals, textualists argue that legislators rarely
even have the chance to read an act’s legislative history. For this
reason, textualists insist that there are ample opportunities for
legislators to inject a pet agenda into the legislative history
without fear of retaliation from competing interests.7 In this
manner, committee reports and floor statements do not record
genuine legislative debate. And legislative materials thus do not
reflect Congress’s actual intent.
Moreover, it is a costly endeavor to cement interestgroup deals in the actual language of a statute—which must
pass through the two houses of Congress and be signed by the
President.8 The insertion of legislative-history language
favorable to the interest group is a much cheaper deal to
strike.9 Because committee members’ views are often in line
with interest groups rather than their fellow lawmakers, this
phenomenon may be quite prevalent.10 Textualists argue that
7

See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 673, 686 nn.56-58 (1997) (citing sources concluding that members of Congress
seldom see legislative history before casting their votes). But see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 377 n.44 (1990) (citing
studies that show legislators are more likely to read a committee report than a bill).
8
Thus, interest groups and lawmakers attempt to smuggle in their deals
under the guise of public-interest legislation. Macey, supra note 3, at 232.
9
See Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 54-55 (1994) (“While the generation of supplementary
legislative materials is costly, it is not nearly so costly as writing more specific statutes.
In addition to the time and manpower necessary to produce the statutory language, it
must be agreed upon by the Congress, a process that becomes more precarious as
legislation becomes more specific.”).
10
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (“Committee membership rarely
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judicial consultation of legislative history increases the
likelihood that these hidden deals will be enforced—thus
making them more valuable and prevalent.11 In light of these
features of the legislative process, textualists firmly believe
that the surest guide to the legislature’s intent is the actual
text of the statute voted upon by members of Congress.
Finally, some textualists rely on insights from publicchoice theory that indicate the legislative process’s inability to
aggregate lawmakers’ individual preferences into a single
collective choice, a contention made famous by Kenneth Arrow.12
One could describe this phenomenon as another dysfunction of
the legislative process. Taking these dysfunctions together,
although the Court lacks a textualist majority, it “now seems to
accept that the uncertainties of the legislative process make it
safer simply to respect the language that Congress selects, at
least when that language is clear in context.”13
To be sure, textualism, as a comprehensive theory of
statutory interpretation, relies on more than an assumption of
the “dysfunctional” legislative process; it also assumes that the
statute’s words rather than legislative intent govern from a
constitutional perspective and that judges simply lack the
institutional capability to make sense of the fragments of
statutory meaning embedded in the legislative record.14 But
imagine a judge who is committed to textualism solely because
she views the legislative process as dysfunctional. She will be
employing a correct methodology when her assumption
matches reality—for example, when she ignores a member’s
statement in the Congressional Record that favored an
interest-group position but was not accepted by his colleagues.
represents a cross-section of the legislature. Instead, legislators tend to self-select into
those committees in which their supporters have the greatest stakes.”).
11
Manning, supra note 7, at 688 (“‘[T]o the degree that judges are perceived
as grasping at any fragment of legislative history for insights into congressional intent,
to that degree will legislators be encouraged to salt the legislative record with
unilateral interpretations of statutory provisions they were unable to persuade their
colleagues to accept.’”) (quoting Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 474 v. NLRB, 814
F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring)); see also, e.g., Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568, 570 (2005) (recognizing that, in some
circumstances, “unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected
staffers and lobbyists” manipulate legislative history to obtain results that they could
not achieve on the face of the statute).
12
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
(citing Arrow’s paradox, which posits that the order in which decisions are made—
rather than majority preferences—dictates the outcome of majority voting).
13
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419 (2003).
14
SCALIA, supra note 1, at 29-37.
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When her assumption does not match reality, however, she will
overlook potentially valuable insight into congressional intent.
Perhaps, for instance, lawmakers voted for the statute with full
knowledge that the legislative history would be used as a gapfilling device.15 The difficulty for the judge, of course, is
distinguishing between these two scenarios—a nearly
impossible task. Inevitably, then, judges at times will invoke
textualism improperly, depending on their own interpretive
theory.16
B.

Purposivism

The second theoretical approach to statutory
interpretation that I will address is purposivism. Purposivism
instructs courts to interpret statutes in a manner that will best
effectuate the statute’s purpose. This approach was made
dominant by the legal-process school, founded by Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks. Hart and Sacks argued that “every statute
must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act” because
“a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea
of law and inadmissible.”17 To determine the statute’s purpose,
Hart and Sacks prescribed three assumptions the judge must
make: (1) statutes are the work of reasonable lawmakers
pursuing reasonable purposes; (2) the statute must not be read
to mandate irrational patterns of outcomes; and (3) what
constitutes an irrational pattern of outcomes must be “judged
in the light of the overriding and organizing purpose.”18
One might argue that purposivism rests upon a rosy
view of the legislative process: there is no consensus among
lawmakers on a statute’s rational purpose, lawmakers are not
rational, and/or there is no enacted logical purpose.19 To the

15

See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics,
Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 265, 273 (Ian
Shapiro ed., 1994) (discussing the influence of rules of construction on legislative
behavior).
16
Some textualists would, of course, have responses to this conundrum that
do not rely on dysfunctions in the legislative process. For instance, Scalia would surely
respond that judges should keep to the text of the statute precisely because they are
institutionally ill-equipped to weed out genuine from strategic legislative history.
17
See generally HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1124-25 (William Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994).
18
Id.
19
On the other hand, it may be that Hart and Sacks thought of their theory
as primarily normative rather than descriptive. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES
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extent purposivists rely on an optimistic view of the legislative
process, they also seem to suffer from the critique that their
methodologies are improperly invoked when the legislative
process does not function in accordance with this view.
Consider a judge who finds an intelligible purpose behind a
statute and applies it to a set of facts because she assumes the
legislative process produces that purpose. The judge will be
invoking a correct methodology if her hypothesis bears true.
But when her assumption does not match reality, the judge
may be imputing a purpose never contemplated by Congress.20
II.

PENALTY DEFAULT INTERPRETIVE CANONS: A NEW
TYPOLOGY

So far, we have seen interpretive methodologies that are
arguably improperly invoked when there is a mismatch
between assumptions about the legislative process and its
actual functioning. In this part, I argue that this categorization
is too narrow—that methodologies sometimes utilize the
tension between their underlying assumptions and reality to
further the functionality of the legislative process.
In the 1980s, legal scholars began to suggest
interpretive methods to combat both the oversupply of privateregarding legislation and an undersupply of public-regarding
legislation. This distortion, according to public-choice theory,
occurs because special interests seek rents from lawmakers at
the expense of a disinterested public. To combat this perceived
inefficiency, some scholars have argued that courts should
interpret statutes narrowly against interest groups.21 Critics
maintain that this approach demands that judges exceed their
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 750
(4th ed. 2007).
20
Of course, some purposivists would argue that, even where there is no
ascertainable purpose, a judge should impart one to develop an organized, principled
statutory regime. This alternative view demonstrates that errors produced by a
particular interpretive methodology will appear or disappear depending on one’s ideal
view of the legislative process and the courts’ role in effectuating that view, which I
discuss below.
21
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 3, at 486-87; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (1984) (suggesting that courts should narrowly
interpret statutes that transfer rents to special interests); Carlos E. Gonzalez,
Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 663-64 (1996) (arguing
that courts must interpret legislation “along public-regarding lines”); cf. Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 123, 134-35 (1989) (predicting that judges who embrace public-choice
theory will construe legislation against special-interest groups).

960

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

interpretive role because public-choice theory does not indicate
the appropriate level of interest-group influence.22 Arguably,
these methods are objectionable when the political process
produces an acceptable level of interest-group activity.
Other interpretive methods, however, simply combat
“hidden” interest-group deals and therefore do not as readily
shift power to the judiciary in an objectionable way. In short,
these methods direct the judge to elevate or ignore certain
aspects of the political process in the hierarchy of
interpretative aids. Jonathan Macey has argued that
interpreting statutes according to their stated purpose will
limit interest-group activity.23 To justify this approach, Macey
contends that interest groups and lawmakers hide their deals
in “hidden-implicit” statutes because “open-explicit” statutes
are more politically costly. By refusing to uncover deals in
hidden-implicit statutes, judges following Macey’s approach
can create incentives for more transparent legislation. Richard
Posner similarly seeks to limit hidden interest-group deals by
simply ignoring them, although he rejects purposivism
precisely because public-choice theory predicts fewer statutes
with public-regarding purposes.24 In Posner’s view, judges
should not conjecture about interest-group activity that is not
publicly available.25
Both Macey’s and Posner’s approaches rest on the
relatively noncontroversial premise that interest-group activity
should be exposed, as opposed to the more controversial
premise that it should be limited.26 To effectuate this goal, both
approaches also rely on a counterfactual vision of the
22

See Elhauge, supra note 10, at 34 (“[A]ny defects in the political process
identified by interest group theory depend on implicit normative baselines and thus do
not stand independent of substantive conclusions about the merits of particular
political outcomes. Accordingly, expansions of judicial review cannot meaningfully be
limited by requiring threshold findings of excessive interest group influence. Further,
the use of interest group theory to condemn the political process reflects normative
views that are contestable and may not reflect the views of the polity.”).
23
Macey, supra note 3, at 227, 238, 250-56.
24
RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985).
25
Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 286 (1982). In pairing different interpretive
techniques with different classes of statutes, William Eskridge essentially adopts this
approach for statutes with concentrated benefits and distributed costs. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 296-97 (1988).
26
Elhauge, supra note 10, at 45 n.72 (carving out from his critique of publicchoice-driven interpretive theories those theories that “rel[y] only on the proposition that
such interpretation alleviates the information cost problems of politics by forcing interest
groups and politicians to publicize any nefarious purpose a ‘captured’ statute has”).
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legislative process. By assuming that the publicly stated
purpose on the face of legislation is correct or by ignoring
nonpublic evidence of interest-group deals, judges counter
hidden special-interest legislation.
Elsewhere, I have recommended a statutory
interpretation methodology that also possesses these
characteristics. My proposal increases the costs of hiddenimplicit special-interest deals by assuming—at times
counterfactually—that the legislature discloses certain specialinterest earmarks in accordance with its own legislative rules.27
This proposal is perhaps less controversial than Macey’s or
Posner’s because it assists the legislature in curing the ills it
perceives of itself. Otherwise, the legislative rules are
effectively unenforceable, either through litigation28 or within
Congress itself.29 Although the methodology assumes the
functionality of the legislative process, it is appropriately
invoked even when reality differs—that is, unless one does not
support the goal of unearthing hidden interest-group deals.
Additionally, when the legislature abides by its own rules and
discloses
special-interest
legislation
accordingly,
the
methodology upholds those deals.
Courts have also developed penalty default interpretive
canons. In attempts to reduce logrolling and nontransparent
lawmaking, the U.S. House and Senate have internal rules
that typically forbid members from adding riders to
appropriations bills without deliberation in the ordinary
committee process. Although these rules are routinely ignored
or waived,30 courts effectively bolster them by employing an
interpretive canon that presumes the legislature does not
substantively amend through appropriations measures, even
though this legislative practice often occurs.
Perhaps the leading case in this area is Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill (TVA), where the Court held that the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 prohibited completion of a dam
27

Kysar, supra note 6, at 562-67.
Courts have ruled that legislative rules are nonjusticiable under the
Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution, except in a few rare cases involving other
constitutional rights or clauses. Id. at 560-61; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting
Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1021-25 (2011).
29
The purpose of the rules, after all, is to require congressional members to
disclose “earmarks” that would otherwise remain hidden. Enforcement by fellow
congressional members would be paradoxical, then, since it would require identifying
hidden earmarks.
30
Sandra Beth Zellman, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 506 (1997).
28
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that would threaten the existence of a rare fish.31 The Court
concluded that continued appropriations for the project did not
repeal substantive law, reasoning that an opposite holding
would “[n]ot only . . . lead to the absurd result of requiring
Members to review exhaustively the background of every
authorization before voting on an appropriation, but it would
flout the very rules the Congress carefully adopted to avoid this
need.”32 The Court then cited an internal House rule that
provided a point of order against substantive amendments in
appropriations.33 This approach is similar to my own in that it
assists the legislature in enforcing rules intended to address
problems Congress sees of itself—the tendency to engage in
legislative subterfuge rather than deliberation. It also
implicitly recognizes Congress’s inability to police rules that
combat legislative subterfuge.
Similarly, the so-called elephant-in-mousehole doctrine,
applied by the Supreme Court34 and the courts of appeals,35
holds that “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details
of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—
it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”36 The
elephant-in-mousehole doctrine has its origins in FDA v. Brown
31

437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
Id. at 190-91.
33
Id. at 191.
34
The Court employed the canon again in Gonzales v. Oregon, when it held
that the attorney general did not have authority under the Controlled Substance Act to
prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs for use in assisted suicides. The Court
rejected “[t]he idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual
authority through an implicit delegation in the CSA’s registration provision.” 546 U.S.
243, 267 (2006) (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Co., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
35
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(citing the elephant-in-mousehole doctrine in holding that the Department of Defense
did not have authority under the National Defense Authorization Act to curtail civilian
employees’ collective-bargaining rights); Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (holding that Congress did not grant the Federal Trade Commission
authority to regulate attorneys under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act because to hold
otherwise would require the conclusion “that Congress not only had hidden a rather
large elephant in a rather obscure mousehole, but had buried the ambiguity in which
the pachyderm lurks beneath an incredibly deep mound of specificity”); NISH v.
Rumsfeld, 348 F.3d 1263, 1269 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We simply do not see the elephant in
the mousehole” where the military claimed that the Randolph-Sheppard Act gave blind
vendors priority in awarding mess hall contracts.).
36
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468. But see Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S.
578, 592 (1980) (“[I]t would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would
require Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that
which is obvious on the face of a statute. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a
court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did
not bark.”).
32
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& Williamson Tobacco Corp., where the Supreme Court held
that nicotine was not regulated by the FDA because it did not
constitute a drug under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. Although nicotine arguably fell within the statute’s broad
definition of “drug,” the Court held that “Congress could not
have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”37
Related to this approach is the “dog-doesn’t-bark” canon.
Under this canon, if a statutory interpretation would
significantly change the existing legal landscape, a lack of
congressional debate on the issue is evidence that Congress did
not intend that interpretation.38 These two canons are striking
in that they defy the insights of public-choice theory—that
interest groups and lawmakers sometimes employ vague terms
or ancillary provisions (or, to use Macey’s language, hiddenimplicit statutes) to convey important benefits. When hiddenimplicit deals occur, these canons work to deny such benefits.
To be sure, the elephant-in-mousehole doctrine and the
dog-doesn’t-bark canon sometimes—if not the majority of
times—simply fulfill congressional intent, as was most likely
the case in FDA v. Brown. In these instances, the canons will
accurately reflect congressional intent by refusing to alter the
legal scheme based on innocuous provisions (rather than by
thwarting a hidden legislative agenda). Still, when members of
Congress deploy obscure lawmaking techniques to reward
interest groups, these canons will frustrate that effort. These
two canons, then, along with the presumption against
substantive lawmaking through appropriations riders, appear
to function—or have the potential to function—as penalty
default interpretive canons. They require the judiciary to
assume the legislative process is working correctly (i.e.,
lawmakers are not engaging in legislative subterfuge) even
37

529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007)
(holding that New Mexico’s local-aid program qualified as “equalized expenditures”
under the Federal Impact Aid Program since, at the time of its enactment, legislative
history indicated no intention to alter the Department of Education’s method of
calculating expenditures); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (rejecting a
particular statutory construction because, in light of extensive legislative history,
“Congress’ silence [on the matter] . . . can be likened to the dog that did not bark”);
Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981) (opinion
withdrawn based on enactment of new statute) (concluding that the Alaska Lands Act
did not apply to non-Alaska land, despite rather clear statutory text to the contrary,
because the legislative history did not indicate “a change in current laws of access of
the magnitude of the . . . proposed interpretation”).
38
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when it malfunctions—resulting in a refusal to convey hidden
special-interest-group benefits.
This exploration of penalty default interpretive canons
generates a rethinking of the errors produced by two of the
archetypal schools of interpretive theory—textualism and
purposivism—which can also be employed as penalty default
interpretive canons. Indeed, Macey’s proposal identifies
purposivism as the means to achieve transparent legislation—
holding the legislature to its stated public-regarding purpose, no
matter its disingenuousness.39 Similarly, textualism, by ignoring
legislative history despite congressional practice to bury low-cost
interest-group deals precisely there, incentivizes legislatures to
elevate special-interest deals to the text of the statute.
Of course, the range of errors produced by these theories
will be minimized or maximized as one accepts more or fewer
types of legislative dysfunctions as proper targets of judicial
incentives. For instance, if one agrees that interest-group
activity should be curtailed, one may not be troubled by a court
casting a public-regarding gloss to a statute, even though the
legislature intended no such purpose.
A second-order question arises, however, after one
accepts that an occurrence in the legislative process is
problematic: whether and to what extent the judiciary should
suppress it. My own view, as I have explored elsewhere, is that
canons assuming the correct functioning of rules that the
legislature sets for itself are less vulnerable to the attack that
the judiciary has exceeded its interpretive function.40 My
approach to the earmark-disclosure rules and the approach
articulated by the TVA Court fall within this subcategory of
penalty default interpretive canons. Legislative rules can be
thought of as indications of congressional intent regarding the
process and content of lawmaking. Recognizing both the
congressional willingness to abide by these rules and the
collective-action problems in doing so, these interpretive
methodologies may assist the legislature in achieving its goal of
enacting legislation in accordance with its rules, even when
individual defections from those rules occur.
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See Macey, supra note 3.
See Kysar, supra note 6, at 568-78 (citing support for the proposal in
accordance with precedent, separation-of-powers theory, textualism, intentionalism,
republicanism, and pluralism). These canons should not apply, however, when the
legislature has collectively waived the rules.
40
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As to my proposal, one might argue that a court’s
bestowal of special-interest benefits when Congress has not, by
its own rules, disclosed them presents greater separation-ofpowers concerns. Indeed, because of those concerns, courts
routinely assume that Congress has followed its own rules in
other contexts.41 This proposal thus dovetails with this case law
by refusing to question Congress’s internal rules of procedure
in accordance with its rulemaking authority granted by the
Constitution.42 In so doing, it recognizes that there is indeed no
legislative bargain when Congress’s own bargaining rules are
not met.
CONCLUSION
This essay starts from the premise that hidden interestgroup deals in the legislative process should be discouraged.
This assumption is useful for identifying penalty default
interpretive canons as tools to discourage those deals. It also
effectuates the primary goal of this essay—to discard the view
that an interpretive theory is improperly invoked when it
paints an unrealistic picture of the legislative process. The
scope and occurrence of such interpretive errors will, of course,
depend on one’s theory of the legislative process and the role of
the judiciary. I therefore do not seek to definitively answer the
question posed by this symposium, “How much work does
language do?” But I hope to reframe our view, as statutory
interpretation scholars, of the interaction between judicial
construction of statutory language and the legislative process.
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See, e.g., Metzenbaum v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 675 F.2d 1282,
1288 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the question of whether Congress has followed its own
rules is nonjusticiable and thus courts, out of “deference,” must assume that Congress
acted in accordance with its rules); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,
672 (1892) (refusing to question the presiding officer’s certification that a bill presented to
and signed by the President was the same as the one enacted by the House).
42
The Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution states that “Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2. Courts interpret this
Clause to stand for the proposition that legislative rules are beyond judicial review. See
John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1790-92 (2003).

